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This paper provides an account of the paradoxes of teaching democracy, the paradoxes of being a citizen in 
a liberal democracy, and the insights that can be gained from the model of citizenship that T.H. Green 
promoted. Green thought citizenship was predicated on the twin foundations of the community and the 
common good. Freedom for Green means individual self-determination coupled with recognition of the 
dependency relations between individuals and the community. Green is noteworthy not only as a theorist 
but also as an active contributor to the development of public schools in England. A consideration of his 
arguments provides a model for educating citizens, addresses the paradoxes of democracy in education, and 
reveals elements of his philosophy that are relevant to educational issues today. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A serious problem confronting educators and policy-makers in advanced liberal-democracies is the 
issue of student apathy about political life. The declining voter turnout rate in Canada, for example, 
suggests a deepening cynicism about the ability and willingness of governments to address citizen 
concerns. What is more disconcerting is the cohort and generational effects of political disengagement.1 
The publicity generated by government scandals, such as the misappropriation of public funds in the 
recent Canadian federal government sponsorship scandal, fuels scepticism. The representative model of 
democracy in which elected and appointed officials exercise substantial decision-making autonomy 
contrasts with the participatory model. The representative model is vulnerable to influence by powerful 
individuals and groups precisely because it is designed to moderate, even override, the judgment of 
citizens by that of elected officials, policymakers, and professionals. The decline of citizen confidence 
in government and its institutions threatens the process of forming democratic identities: informed, 
critically aware, and vigilant citizens who desire to participate as equals in public life and to be included 
in policy formation and decision-making. 
There has been robust debate over the nature and role of the democratic citizen. As Mark 
Warren explains, thinkers such as James Madison, James Mill, Joseph Schumpeter, and more recently, 
neo-conservatives seek to balance democratic participation against other desirable goals, such as 
protecting rights and freedoms and governability by limiting the areas of society that are subject to 
democratic imperatives. Another group of thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, T. 
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H. Green, and John Dewey argue that those who seek to limit democracy in such a manner may 
themselves be accentuating some of the participatory problems by purposefully limiting citizen 
involvement. These differences, Warren continues, emerge partly as a result of differing assumptions 
about the self and its relations to political and social life. The one perspective conceives selves as 
individuals whose interests are not to be subjected to the vicissitudes of political life such as majority 
will or transformative social experiments. The other suggests that if individuals were more active and 
involved—particularly in institutions that most greatly affect their lives, such as schools and 
workplaces—citizens would become more publicly-spirited, tolerant, knowledgeable selves who would 
be better situated to reassess and articulate their own perspectives and interests.2
The sources of citizen discontent and apathy are diverse and complex, yet those who cast 
aspersions against liberal-democratic governments for this state of affairs need to reconsider other 
factors. One cause must be the way students are socialized to adopt their future roles as citizens.3 
Students’ educational experiences and self-understandings will shape their views on the efficacy of civic 
engagement. While educators and policymakers face mounting pressure to promote democratic values, 
the paucity of democratic pedagogy represents one of many paradoxes confronting educators today. 
The systematic review, discussion, and assessment of political institutions and the requirements of 
citizenship occur only once students enter colleges and universities. It cannot be a coincidence that the 
erosion of confidence in political institutions is occurring at the same time as public (and private) 
school systems are increasingly acceding to labour market imperatives by devoting more resources to 
courses and programs that emphasize so-called skills development. There are clear indicators that 
present educational thought and policies are resurrecting ideas and practices that thinkers long ago 
revealed as irredeemably flawed. 
The centrality of education to the development of more tolerant, knowledgeable, and probing 
citizens is a topic of long-standing concern. The ideal of democratic education has two broad 
justifications that generate tensions if one is advanced at the expense or to the exclusion of the other. 
The first is the intrinsically good perspective that presumes education, as the generic pursuit of knowledge, is 
good in itself. The exploration of democratic values and beliefs such as tolerance, respect, equality, and 
freedom is defended as inherently worthwhile and necessary to conceptual and philosophical 
understanding. The second is the extrinsically good perspective. Education is valued for its ability to provide 
students basic functional skills such as reading and writing, and, at more advanced levels, applied 
research. Certainly democratic citizens must be sufficiently literate to meet the communicative demands 
of modern social and economic life. However, schools and teachers are increasingly under pressure to 
forge functionally literate individuals capable of finding gainful employment. While both the intrinsic 
and utilitarian justifications of education can conflict—particularly in the allocation and distribution of 
limited educational resources—there is no inherent and insurmountable chasm separating them. 
If the purpose of education is to prepare young people for social life—a life that is about the 
intrinsic welfare of persons and about the extrinsic qualitative world in which they function—then the 
difficulty with privileging the extrinsically good perspective is that the intrinsic well-being of individual 
students becomes at best incidental but more likely irrelevant to the goals of education.4 Yet the 
extrinsically good perspective purports to include in its goals the value of democracy, a value it 
presumes educators and students will consider worthy of defence. Stephen Esquith uses the terms 
political clientism and political consumerism to express a dominant self-understanding of modern liberal-
democratic citizens. As political clients, liberal citizens depend on professionals, public planners, and 
policymakers for advice, assistance, and expert services. As political consumers, citizens reserve the 
                                                 
2 Warren, 1992, pp. 8-9.  
3 See, for example, Meirick & Wackman, 2004; Sapiro, 2004; Dudley & Gitelson, 2004; Patrick, 2002; Galston, 
2001. 
4 Nicholson, 1990, pp. 166-177.  
 Darin R. Nesbitt and Elizabeth Trott 63 
right to make some final decisions for themselves.5 To presume that citizens are principally clients and 
consumers is to assume that the democratic values of choice and autonomy are intimately related to the 
intrinsically valued sense of being worthy, respected, and independent human beings. The connection 
between intrinsic worth and the social and political conditions of its preservation is not self-evident and 
consequently requires specific educational advocacy. The processes and goals of democratic politics—
the formal equality of citizens, the possibility that voters can replace governments, and the recognition 
and protection of basic rights and freedoms—require intrinsic justification. 
As functioning systems, schools (and throughout this paper ‘schools’ typically refer to ones that 
precede universities and colleges) seldom stand as models of democracy. Hierarchical administrative 
procedures, official external bodies that approve curricula, and the power relations that define the 
classroom encounters between students and teachers demonstrate little connection to democratic 
theory and practices. Moreover, external pressures on schools (including colleges and universities) to 
adopt market-oriented measures to attract students and to justify education in terms of student self-
interest and material gain (which we regard as different from intrinsic welfare) can undermine a school’s 
ability to inculcate democratic values such as equal rights and respect for others. Undoubtedly there are 
elementary or primary and secondary programs where students contribute to social service projects and 
conscientious teachers who promote these activities, but unless there is an overall policy directed 
towards understanding one’s role as a citizen, such efforts may not have lasting impact. 
This paper examines the educational visions of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) in order to 
better understand these issues and to revisit some paradoxes generated by the ideal of democratic 
education. Green supported a conception of a common good that shaped and informed his policy 
prescriptions. For Green, the telos of education was the creation of diverse individuals who were also 
active supporters of and participants in civic life. To achieve this objective, Green insisted educational 
practices must be universalistic—meaning inclusive—and exhibit greater uniformity of curricula goals. 
Access to knowledge is everyone’s right: rich and poor, men and women.6 Curriculum should not be 
the secluded domain of specific religious interests but instead universal and non-denominational. Green 
advocated a democratization of education based on the principle of what will be described here as 
mutual independency. One of Green’s most important observations was that the value of individuality 
could only be discerned in the context of other selves. The individual and society were not contrary but 
rather complimentary conceptions. The ideal of the citizen is the bridge between the individual and 
society. Being a citizen, Green argued, is integral to one’s identity, not an occasionally assumed mantle. 
 
 
Background of T. H. Green 
 
Green was an influential scholar and reform-minded university administrator at Balliol College, Oxford. 
In 1855, at the age of nineteen, Green entered Balliol where his reputation as a great thinker was later 
established. In 1860, at the age of twenty-four, Green became a teacher at Oxford, lecturing on ancient 
and modern history at Balliol. Later that year he was elected fellow of Balliol, and subsequently was 
elected tutor in the fall of 1866. Green’s crowning academic achievement was his appointment as 
White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1878. As a tutor, he was active in university affairs, 
particularly in initiating and campaigning for curricula and administrative reform. Green and his mentor 
Benjamin Jowett were instrumental in creating and delivering university extension programs at Oxford, 
and Green was the first administrator of an extension college attached to Balliol. He was an active 
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promoter of a plan in 1867 to provide scholarships to help students and families who could not afford 
the cost of university at Oxford. 
Green later publicly supported the National Education League in its calls for compulsory 
attendance, public funding of elementary schools, and non-sectarian instruction. He spoke in support 
of a resolution by the National Education League to agitate for a compulsory national system of non-
denominational education.7 Throughout the 1870s Green became more involved in elementary 
education within the city of Oxford. He frequently lamented that one of the finest universities in the 
world also was largely inaccessible to most of Oxford’s residents. Green served on the School Board 
for Oxford Elementary Schools, and was a well-known advocate for the education of all children, boys 
and girls, at the elementary and secondary levels. Tellingly, the last public act of his comparatively short 
life was to participate in the establishment of the High School for Boys in Oxford.8
For Green, educational institutions needed to play a cardinal role in the development of critical 
citizens and harmonious social and political life. In an undergraduate essay entitled The Duties of the 
University to the State, he argued it was the overriding purpose of a university to generate anew principles 
of thought and action in order to influence and shape public opinion. The university has two duties: to 
inculcate “...the design of the whole social fabric, and discern in their ever-changing forms those 
unchanging principles in which the foundations of human life are laid...” and to apply “...these 
unchanging principles to the various callings of social life, and the common duties of a citizen.”9 He 
further remarked that universities should elevate, not mimic or reproduce, public opinion, and educate 
citizens “...for their work in life, not by teaching them its details, but by informing their minds with 
those ideas which are embodied in all works alike, or at any rate in their combined results.”10 Green 
also insisted education—as a social institution that provides universal access to schools and implements 
curriculum—can prevent communities from “...splitting up into rival crafts or guilds, solely bent on 
pursuing class-interests, and inflamed against each other by professional jealousy.”11 While Green 
would later modify some of these ideas and ideals—particularly his views on academic specialization—
the basic principles underlying his general views on education remained firm. The university should 
provide moral and intellectual guidance, educators should inculcate the longing for truth, and schools 
should form citizens rather than consumers, workers, or specialists. 
Yet university students do not spring ex nihilo. They emerge from school systems, and Green 
soon turned his attention to the formative years of education.12 Green widely articulated his concerns 
in lectures, published papers, and community addresses to unravel the various contradictions he 
considered detrimental to the erection and maintenance of educational institutions predicated on goals 
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such as the promotion of democratic principles and practices.13 Three sources of these educational 
contradictions follow. 
 
 
Three Systemic Educational Contradictions 
 
The Wealthy and the Poor  
 
A decade of reflection and activism by Green about education in the 1870s revealed how far the 
distance was between his educational ideals and actual education practices. Green’s own experience 
with elementary and secondary schools and universities led him to promote a system of education that 
had as its distinguishing mark the goals of individual rights and social equality. A state system of 
education could address basic educational needs unmet by individuals, groups, and associations, 
however well intentioned, acting on their own. In his capacity as an assistant commissioner for the 
Schools Inquiry (or Taunton) Commission, Green soon recognized that funding mechanisms for 
schools were disparate and thus produced significant differences in instructional delivery.14 It was also 
widely recognized that, of the roughly three thousand public schools in the United Kingdom with 
endowments earmarked for the poor, many of these endowments were insufficient—either by 
mismanagement or abuse—to meet their mandates and needs. 
The gap between rich and poor required a mediation facility, and Green promoted the 
establishment of one in Oxford. Such a school would facilitate the transition of students from 
elementary school to the universities through scholarships based both on material need and merit. 
Green was deeply concerned about the lack of interest shown by the poor, the middle classes, and the 
wealthy in the success of the emerging national school system. This contradiction between public 
apathy and the benefits gained by schooling required a synthesis to increase public awareness. Many of 
Green’s speeches and letters were designed to provide that synthesis, to educate the public about the 
social benefits of education.15 He wrote: “...the whole of society would gain most thoroughly by the 
removal of social barriers, by the promotion of a better feeling between class and class, that better 
feeling which a common education alone can produce.”16 A national, sufficiently funded education 
system would improve opportunities for the poor, raise education as an issue of national, public 
interest, and help to harmonize and equalize relations between classes. 
Green attributed to the state an important role in providing education resources and 
opportunities for the youth, but he was no dogmatic advocate of either privately or publicly funded 
schools. Green believed the state had a positive role to play in removing obstacles to individual self-
development, and the provision of education was the kind of public good that necessitated state 
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involvement. Without education individuals could not develop the character necessary to become 
thoughtful and active citizens. Schools were therefore public goods insofar as they benefited both the 
community as a whole and its individual members. Green, like most of his Victorian contemporaries, 
was concerned that state funding of schools could undermine their autonomy—and this was precisely 
the reason why Oxford and Cambridge universities generally rebuffed efforts at government 
involvement—but the context and problem area were for Green more decisive policy considerations 
than abstract principles. 
 
The Secular and the Faithful  
 
In his Lecture on the Grading of Secondary Schools, Green discussed his experiences with the Taunton 
Commission.17 He explained: “I was then looking forward...to a reconstitution, at no very distant time, 
of the middle and higher education of England, and…if not to a reconstitution of society through that 
of education, yet at least to a considerable change in its tone and to the removal of many of its 
barriers.”18 His main recommendations were to expand the number of secondary schools, to transform 
Oxford and Cambridge universities into national educational institutions, and to help forge new 
universities throughout the United Kingdom. After a decade of effort to create a national, uniform, and 
common system of education, Green soberly remarked “...the hope on which the Oxford reformers of 
my generation have fondly fed, of drawing from a stratum of society previously unconnected with the 
university, has been hitherto unfulfilled.”19
Green believed the central obstacle to education reform was the voluntary system that mitigated 
against a coherent and functional system of schools. From 1780 to 1870, elementary schools in Great 
Britain were established and maintained by individuals, religious groups, or charitable organizations, 
although after 1833 government endowments were increasingly being provided. One consequence was 
that each school district had irregular provisions for education. The wealthier and denominationally 
active districts were providing education for youth, but other districts lagged far behind. The quality of 
instructional delivery was uneven, and therefore many promising students were unable to fulfill their 
academic potential. From the free play of discrete yet powerful religious interests emerged an 
incoherent system of education that failed to uniformly meet the needs of students and communities. 
On the one hand, the established Anglican Church with its funds and national organization had many 
advantages in creating schools at local levels. On the other, religious dissenters such as Independents, 
Baptists, and Quakers wished to establish their own denominational schools. Consequently, Green 
observed, “...each school, instead of being one member of an organism, has to act as an independent 
whole.”20 This state of affairs produced disparate curricula and no universal principles for students and 
educators to recognize as sources of coherency. 
Green’s opposition to denominational schools and sectarianism was not based upon what is 
understood today as secularism in education. He supported religious direction in schools because of the 
spiritual needs of students and of the potentially integrative power of religious faith. Green’s 
philosophical and humanistic understanding of Christianity meant that doctrinal differences were to be 
overcome, not reproduced, in schools.21 It followed that the state, as the only institution that could 
legitimately claim to represent the entire community, must mediate between the various churches and 
sects either to prevent the emergence of or to offset sectarian interests. It was therefore imperative that 
public funding mechanisms not advantage one group over another. Green insisted the Schools Inquiry 
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Commission’s recommendation to create provincial authorities to harmonize the administrative, 
managerial, and instructional needs of schools would have rectified these problems had it been 
implemented in its undiluted form. 
 
The State and Parents: Compulsory Education and Free Choice 
 
The modern objective of compulsory attendance certainly stands in sharp contrast to liberalism’s 
emphasis on free choice and autonomy. Attendance at British elementary schools was voluntary until 
the passing of the 1870 Elementary Education Act. The policy of compulsory attendance was 
controversial. Parents, perceiving themselves as having power over their children, defended the right to 
keep children at home to work and help with the family. Green defended a national system of 
education as the means to resolving this conflict between the educational needs of children and parental 
authority. When school boards are established and faithfully represent the people, Green felt, parents 
will neither consider compulsory school attendance an unnecessary intrusion upon parents’ rights nor 
an infringement of parental authority. Grasping the big picture about the value of education would 
change the perception of restraint (compulsory attendance) to the recognition of freedom (the self as 
flourishing, and in command it of its decisions). Attendance must be understood as necessary to 
student success. 
By the mid-1870s, Green was informing audiences and educational associations that sufficient 
reforms had been made at Oxford University such that access to the institution was as open as he and 
other similar-minded activists had envisioned. Formal barriers to university entrance no longer applied 
to religious dissenters, and tuition rates were not beyond the means of a majority of families.22 
Consequently, Green’s reform energies were directed toward primary and secondary education, and he 
advocated a publicly managed system. His tireless promotion of the teaching of democratic principles 
influenced both curriculum developments and social policy regarding the inclusion of both genders in 
public education in his day. The idea that public education would forge equal citizens began to take 
hold. 
 
 
Resolving the Contradictions: Policy, Curriculum, and the Self  
 
The need for principles to resolve educational contradictions was paramount since proposing a public 
system by itself left unanswered what and how knowledge would be instilled. In his political writings, 
Green relied heavily on the principle of the common good. If we are capable of recognizing a common 
good, our having done so identifies us as rational and commits us to supporting it (or so Green would 
argue). He rejected the view that either individual or social good could be derived from utilitarian 
premises: that the good derives from the maximum amount of happiness or utility measured by 
individual preference satisfaction. Green’s conception of the common good is an ideal that all in 
principle share. What is evoked or recognized as the common good must meet three conditions: (a) it 
must be good for all individuals, (b) no one should gain by another’s loss, and (3) loss and gain must be 
estimated on the same principle for each person.23 If good is common to everyone, then the good of 
others is necessarily related to my own good. In theory, the common good is grounded in the public’s 
recognition that opportunities for individual self-realization should be a universal goal.  
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68 Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 
For Green, a public system of education would create an institutional setting for the recognition 
of mutuality between the poor, the middle class, and the wealthy, and between the universities and the 
nation itself. Yet he noted that this recognition of mutuality would not likely arise spontaneously. 
Mutuality requires not only systemic links between citizens, associations, institutions, and governments, 
but also conscious recognition of those links as constitutive and informative. The recognition of 
mutuality is necessary to address the tensions between internal limitations (the development of 
individual talents and capabilities) and external constraints (formal barriers to education). For mutuality 
to flourish, common ground must be found: perhaps in recognizing a contradiction, or formulating a 
curriculum focus, or sharing a goal that illuminates our mutuality. For example, we must all value justice 
at some level to talk about its inculcation. The recognition of mutuality can become embedded in the 
development and implementation of curriculum. There must be principles that override personal and 
private preferences in education. 
The policy dimensions of the common good must be worked out by those responsible for 
educating students to comprehend the common good. The practical problem that arises is who is to 
educate citizens to recognize the common good. Certainly Green’s writings and speeches indicate he 
was not sanguine of the prospects of powerful and influential social, political, religious, and economic 
groups and associations claiming the fulcrum of the common good. The agents charged with the task, it 
would seem, are teachers at the primary, secondary, and post-secondary levels whose main 
responsibility is to unlock student potential and explore the meaning of social and political life. We turn 
now to elaborate the philosophical theory that Green established as the basis of reform. 
 
Freedom as a Goal of Education  
 
For Green, education is a process whereby individuals acquire the freedom to determine their futures. 
Green’s conception of freedom was shaped by diverse sources including Locke, Kant, and Hegel. 
Hegelian freedom is the pure act of thought, the awareness of our conscious powers to be and to act in 
the world. Ultimate freedom of thought occurs when thought makes itself its own object, for in that act 
the contradictions that structure experiences are unavoidably revealed in consciousness, a revelation 
that for Hegel is the meaning of truth. The oppositions that form possible experiences—form and 
content, the extrinsic and the intrinsic, rational restraint and free choice—determine objects of thought. 
In grasping this necessity of thought process one transfigures the meaning of freedom.24 The idea of 
free choice, for Hegel, is a contradiction. Choosing is an act of thought without content and therefore 
not about anything, and if it is about something, then the content of thought is the determinant of 
choice.25
Green, pressed by the need for contemporary social analysis, formulated the concept of freedom 
in his own terms. Freedom involves the self as a thinking agent and also as inextricably related to other 
selves. If we consider other selves as constraints, as negations of our goals, we are not free. We constantly 
struggle to overcome the contradiction of being self-aware and inwardly individuated. Yet we have to 
think and act in the world that limits us. We can neither avoid nor negate social relations: Green posited 
relations as the product of consciousness. The unity of nature and knowledge is grounded with 
consciousness as a universal phenomenon. Whatever presents itself to us is made intelligible by 
conceptually locating and relating it to what is already known by a particular consciousness.26 Relations 
of dependency and independency are necessary to the formation of one’s understanding of self. One 
                                                 
24 See Hegel, 1991, §38-40. 
25 Hegel’s example to illustrate the shift from external constraint to internal understanding, and hence the 
experience of freedom, is helpful: “A criminal, when punished may look upon his punishment as a restriction of 
his freedom. Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to which he is subjected, but the manifestation of his 
own act: and if he recognizes this, he comports himself as a free man.” (Hegel, 1975, p. 283).  
26 Green explores this theory in Green, 1884, §1-8. 
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cannot have a truthful understanding of one’s self without overcoming the oppositions that others 
seem to represent by acknowledging and then constructing relations between oneself and others. 
Freedom is enhanced as one grasps the essentialness of others to one’s very existence as a self-
determining agent. 
If we momentarily set aside Green’s formal theorizing about the nature of freedom, we can 
recast what he is attempting to demonstrate. By viewing the self as at least partly constituted by what it 
considers to be its interests, and moreover recognizing that the self is situated in an environment where 
there will be both cooperation and conflict in realizing interests, we must appreciate the extent to which 
the self is capable of participating in the context of cooperative and competing human activities. Yet it 
is preferable that selves distinguish between their wants or needs and interests and express them to 
others. Green understands that an individual’s interests will not always be consistent with her needs and 
therefore the development of selves should be predicated on ensuring there are institutional and social 
mechanisms to encourage self-examination and critical awareness of interests that are, as best as can be, 
matched with human needs. More important, if the goods that individuals seek are located within a 
context of cooperation and conflict, then every interest has political and social dimensions that require 
selves to assess areas where there will be cooperation and conflict and formulate courses of action. 
In Green’s time, a prominent utilitarian view was that society is as an aggregate of individuals in 
which the sum of the discrete interests of its members represents the public interest or good. Green’s 
goal was to reconsider the meaning of the individual in society by emphasizing both the individual and 
societal character of interests and needs. In place of exclusively individuated interests, Green stressed 
what we can call the principle of mutual independence. His idea of mutually independent and necessary 
relations between self, others, and the community became an integral component of a transformation 
in late nineteenth-century liberalism, a transformation Green himself played a substantial role in 
bringing about. The principle of mutual independence could be used to address the structural and 
systemic sources of poverty and unemployment, to promote access to education, and to reveal the 
societal forces that shape an individual’s development. Green argued that individuals should be 
governed in their actions by their grasp of their place in a community sustained by the principle of 
mutual independence. This recognition would balance the goal of forging independent and self-reliant 
selves with other-dependent relations and thus provide a better foundation for citizenship pedagogy. 
 
Reform and Democracy  
 
If Green’s theory is convincing, then reforms in policy areas such as education, housing, working 
conditions, and poverty must be everyone’s concern.  “Everyone” meant using the state (in theory, all) 
and legislation (born of democratic institutions to express the will of the community) to achieve social 
and economic policy objectives. Green fully supported the liberal ideal of autonomous selves in that he 
insisted the state could not forge an individual’s moral character. His self-realization ethic is predicated 
on the development and exercise of individual judgment. The moral self must rationally and freely 
choose right courses of action. Governments nonetheless have a legitimate and necessary role to play in 
shaping (and circumscribing) the general political, social, and economic conditions within which 
individuals are situated. The state can address social and economic circumstances, but the relations 
between people must be governed by individuals.27 A public education system could address barriers to 
self-development or, in Green’s term, “self-realization” (an idea to which we will return). The role of 
the state is to create and to secure the social, political, and economic conditions in which individuals 
can develop their latent capacities and capabilities to the fullest extent possible. The concept of being a 
citizen (and by “citizen” Green meant someone who possesses legal rights to vote and to serve on a 
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possible, and morality [consists] in the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties....” (Green, 1986, §18). 
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jury and who is committed to the principles and virtues of democracy) is the outcome of the unifying 
relations of mutual independency, which is also the basis of individual equality.28
That communities need citizens who recognize and practice virtues is by no means an original 
idea. It is, however, noteworthy to suggest that teachers not only teach facts or train carpenters, but 
also shape metaphysical visions and play a crucial part in creating citizens. For Green, the contradiction 
of state (source of power and restraint) and citizen (source of ideas, labour, and individual agency) 
could be resolved through the recognition of democratic principles as a necessary element of 
community identity. In non-democratic states, self and other remain in a state of perpetual suspicion 
and fear. If we agree about the value of participating in decision-making because we recognize that 
participation furthers our freedom, then participation is a vital relating activity. Such a notion 
consequently has deep and profound implications for educational theory and practice. 
 
From Theory to Practice  
 
Can Green’s philosophy translate into practical application for educators today? The challenge for 
educators is to offer opportunities to individuals to create their own system of relations and their own 
flourishing network of principles grasped and interests pursued while nurturing mutual independency. 
The child needs to develop as uniquely and differently as she can but avoid developing relations to 
other children and adults that cast them as inherently threatening. For the child, the contradiction that 
looms is how to be both the same and different. 
Consider some examples of what Green’s claims indicate about classroom experiences and the 
development of good character. The first such consequence revolves around interpersonal relations 
between the teacher and student. One such barrier (we suggest) is the hypocrisy and double standards 
of classroom practices and etiquette. A child may be compelled to adopt social relations and conduct 
established by adults, but the child needs consciously and actively to adopt them. If not, accepted 
conduct may be chosen merely for individual gain or to please others, both of which are contrary to 
Green’s self-realization ethic. For example, requiring children to be polite and respectful in accordance 
with tradition or custom (or fear of punishment), yet allowing adults to flout such social customs, can 
result in such conduct appearing not as an inherently valuable social practice but instead a privilege of 
power. A teacher who denigrates students or openly demonstrates hostility can extract polite behaviour 
from students. Yet while students may demonstrate obedience in this context, it almost certainly 
imparts a distorted power relation. 
If equal opportunity is to be meaningful, then experiences that expose the child to understanding 
equality (and inequality) must be part of her self-development through relation constructions. For 
example, a child can experience the results of both merit-based and equal- opportunity policies in 
classroom activities. As parents and educators well know, children are not tiny bundles of altruism. The 
challenge is to determine the appropriate points where the meritorious and fairness principles are to be 
applied. Meritorious principles of distribution do not always allow for equal opportunity. Repeated 
exposure to distributive practices creates relations between the child and others in the classroom. If a 
child is not deemed merit worthy, then opportunities for participation are limited, as are the intrinsic 
and extrinsic goods that flow from classroom projects and activities. Double standards, such as those 
that champion equality and yet reward (and thus encourage) merit-based activities in the classroom do 
                                                 
28 Leland commented that Green’s philosophy  
…takes its place as a vindication in the growing social democracy of England, of the right of 
every human being to an education according to his capacity….Without the right to an 
education the child lacks the opportunities which are the very basis of his moral 
development—his participation in the common good. A child’s rights are in proportion to 
what there is in him to become. This indicates an educational democracy—a school democracy 
of equal opportunity. (Leland, 1911, p.53). 
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raise questions about the authenticity of any educational efforts at socialization. It is not surprising that 
students become cynical, hostile, and apathetic. Reform in education must result in the creation of 
students who have constructed for themselves their necessary bonds to the standards of conduct 
expected in communities committed to rights, equality, and respect. We turn now to Green’s principle 
of individual self-realization, which provides an alternative perspective on forging student experiences. 
 
 
Educating Selves in the Common Good 
 
Realizing the Self  
 
One implication of Green’s conception of individuality is that the interests, needs, and desires that 
define individuals are shaped by the limitations and possibilities of political and social institutions. 
Citizens are reflections of the limitations of liberal-democratic discourse and practice as much as the 
possibilities inherent in liberal-democratic institutions. Our needs, interests, and desires are shaped and 
circumscribed by membership in groups and associations, the discursive and structural norms of such 
groups and associations, and the broader system of social norms and values. Our interests and 
preferences will be shaped and formed not simply in the exercise of choice itself but also by the 
opportunities and limitations imposed on us. Freedom consequently is a social capacity that individuals 
will develop through interactions with others by recognizing both difference and identity, by 
acknowledging others as separate selves with their own discrete capacities and interests, and by 
appreciating areas where we can speak of sharing some experiences and interests. 
“Individual self-realization” for Green is an institutional process of providing the ideal context 
and setting for individuals to achieve their latent capacities and powers. Avital Simhony has provided a 
three-fold explanation of individual self-realization: a) it requires a view of shared social life whereby 
individual self-development is achievable only in conjunction with others; b) this “good” is common to 
all members of a given community; and c) the good pertains to each member individually, not the 
community as a whole.29 Applying individual self-realization to the context of education reveals 
Green’s objective was not that all students should receive the same or an identical education. Individual 
self-realization cannot be achieved under such conditions. If students who do not qualify for university 
or college find their vocations, but had genuine opportunities to advance in their elementary and 
secondary education, then the standards established by individual self-realization have been met.30 
Green’s conception of the common good is shaped by the liberal presumption of individual self-
interest, yet also provides a deeper, richer understanding of relations with others. For Green it is natural 
that a perpetual process of differentiation and integration occurs in relationships between the individual 
and society and between individuals. 
There is a close relationship in Green’s theory between individual self-realization and the 
common good, but one complicated by the range of human goods he identifies. Green appears to 
discuss at least three conceptions of the good. The first is what we can call individual goods that are 
material, scarce, and generate claims to exclude others from use such as property. These individual 
goods Green recognizes as necessary to achieve discrete individual goals, although they are not strictly 
                                                 
29 Avital Simhony, 2001, pp. 72-73. 
30 Nicholson, 1990, p. 174. Green would concur with J. S. Mill who remarked in his On Liberty that  
[t]o be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others develops the feelings and capacities 
which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their 
good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable except such force of character as 
may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. 
To give fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to 
lead different lives. (Mill, 1978, pp. 60-61)  
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speaking moral goods because they entail competition. Green also recognizes another series of human 
goods that can be designated as public goods such as parks, roads, health, and education. The remaining 
good is what Green has been referring to as a common good. Green speaks of the common good as one 
that does not admit competition, such as the pursuit of individual goods, yet is both individual and 
social in nature. What kind of goods would meet this condition? Green identifies a number of such 
human goods, including shared heritage and history, language, national culture, religion, membership in 
professional and social associations, and citizenship. Perhaps most important of these would be a 
general system of rights and freedoms that requires social recognition.31 The significance of maintaining 
a system of rights and freedoms, and its implications for education, will be examined shortly. 
The task for today’s teacher charged with teaching children how to comprehend the common 
good, guiding the exploration of their potentials, and then imparting to students that it is in their 
interest to acknowledge others’ interests, seems Herculean if not Sysiphean in scope. Children, for the 
most part, will tend instinctively to value ‘mine’ over ‘thine.’ Moreover, what might be achieved in one 
class can be destroyed in the next. Has Green posed the ultimate contradictory principle as the focus of 
curriculum planning and classroom pedagogy—that self-interest and the common good can be 
understood as logically and necessarily related? 
 
The Self and Others 
 
According to Green, the first condition of experience is the self, and individual self-consciousness 
supplies the distinction between self and other, self and nature, and self and social environment. 
Children come to recognize that there are others in the world competing with them to fulfill their 
desires.32 They confront their first contradiction early when they distinguish between ‘mine,’ ‘thine,’ and 
‘ours.’ This discovery is complicated by the fact that what is mine may be, both in class and elsewhere, 
only temporarily so. That is what conflict and cooperation entail. Children enter the world and the 
world of the classroom experiencing a perpetual contradiction, being both the self that seeks to act in 
the world—to seek experience and understanding—and the self that resists the limitations of others—
the self that wants to individuate itself. 
The fact of being a self-conditioned or free energy acting under limiting conditions can produce 
a sense of perpetual self-contradiction between what one is and what one could be. Children confront 
this fact at every turn. There are always standards and expectations, performances and achievements, all 
of which make self-development a source of both disappointment and pride. The contradictory 
relations of success and failure have to be sustained on a daily basis. Our recognition of this 
contradiction generates the impulse or need both for knowledge and goodness—more knowledge to 
understand the source of contradictions, and goodness that recognizes human error with knowledge of 
the benefits of forgiveness and mercy. The perceived contradictions between self and other, between 
knowledge and ignorance, may be overcome or at least mitigated if students can be educated to search 
for truth, however discomforting it may sometimes be, and to will what is unselfish. 
The demands on a teacher to explain such contradictions reside uneasily with the need to 
establish authority and classroom discipline and to reward performance and excellence. Helping 
children to seek their own self-individuation and yet see others as integral to achieving their goals 
requires problem solving within the context of conflict and cooperation. Cooperation and respectful 
competition, time afforded to explain notions of dependency, and consistent classroom practices (not 
                                                 
31 See Nesbitt, 2001. 
32 Green is working out the practical implications of Hegel’s theory of the self. Selves for Hegel become self-
conscious only in relation to nature, to other similar conscious selves, and to the universal spirit in the world; see 
Hegel, 1966, pp. 219-266, especially p. 226. Leighton demonstrated that Green also was influenced by Ferdinand 
Christian Baur, a German theologian and founder of the Tübingen school of theology; see Leighton, 2004, p. 53. 
For a later neo-Hegelian (F. H. Bradley) theory of the self, see Trott, 1996. 
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“two-faced” classroom rules) must become part of a child’s daily, indeed hourly, experiences in order to 
establish the dialectic of self and others. A child’s earliest exposure to authority beyond the home (and 
religion) is in the classroom, and her experiences there inevitably initiate constructions of relations with 
others. To create a community in the classroom, classroom practices must be seen as supportive of 
selves in conjunction with others, with some understanding of the common good being promoted. 
Green’s theory would suggest that the relation between competition and self-realization has to be very 
carefully balanced. The long-term effects of selves “developed” under excessively competitive 
circumstances may include both realized selves and an array of unrealized selves, conditions which 
hardly further appreciation of the common good. 
 
The Self, Rights, and the Common Good  
 
Education frees individuals. If limitations can be acknowledged and addressed, then ideas, decisions, 
and actions may overcome circumstances. Green’s evocation of a common good indicates that a 
properly educated self is one that can distinguish between self and others, can assess courses of actions 
and interests in terms of what is best, ideal, or perfect, and can then transcend its own interests and 
values and measure them by reference to others’ interests, values, and goods. To adopt these objectives, 
there must be some evidence or manifestation of this common good. Green’s political theory suggests 
that a system of individual rights is sufficient evidence of such a common good. 
The rights relationship formed between individuals is foundational to liberal-democratic 
citizenship. Rights relations and claims are the principal means by which conflicting political, social, and 
economic values and interests are articulated and resolved. What are rights? At the most basic level, 
rights are claims to something or from something. For example, a right to a peaceful social and political 
environment involves both a claim to be secure and a claim against decisions and actions that would 
undermine or threaten security. Green’s originality as a rights theorist derived from his recognition that 
individual rights have individual and social dimensions. Rights for Green are recognized claims to some 
individual or social good acknowledged in customs, traditions, and laws. The evolution of individual, 
human rights presupposes that individuals are equal to the extent they are capable of participating in 
broad dialogue about claims (and counter-claims) to be treated in certain ways. 
A child therefore needs to understand and identify with the rights-duty relationship. This poses a 
new contradiction for the teacher: introducing rights-based dialogue while perpetually limiting the 
child’s sphere of actions. Such limitations can be: mental, through introducing progressively more 
difficult assignments; emotional, by requiring emotional restraints on the child but not always the 
teacher; and physical, such as demanding more sitting at desk work and less moving around. In the face 
of such limitations, what discussions and activities can students perform to further their understanding 
of their individual rights and the rights of others? Do they grasp the discourse of rights as both 
individual and social in nature? Exposure to the goods that accrue from community (read classroom) 
negotiations over shared problems can be beneficial and some semblance of participating in community 
goods can be experienced in classrooms that encourage such activities. 
How then can teachers guide students to deepen their understanding of rights discourse and 
citizenship? Simulations are powerful pedagogical tools. Parliamentary simulations—having students 
assume roles such as the prime minister, opposition leaders, and backbenchers—can be engaging but 
have a tendency to focus on debate and conflict rather than compromise and agreement. This should 
not be surprising since parliamentary governments within Canada normally compromise in legislative 
committees or privately with opposition and house leaders. Only the most discerning of observers can 
recognize when public officials are cooperating. Another form of simulation offers great promise: 
constitutional dialogue. The effort in Canada to amend the constitution in the early 1990s—the 
Charlottetown Accord—ultimately failed insofar as Canadians rejected the proposed constitutional 
changes through a nation-wide referendum, but the process revealed that future constitutional change 
almost assuredly will involve active involvement by citizens and groups. A properly conceived and 
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constructed exercise where, for example, students create a classroom bill of rights would place them 
precisely in a situation entailing both conflict and cooperation. 
There is currently little in the educational experience that exposes children to the intrinsic or 
extrinsic value of shared dialogue, negotiation, challenge, compromise, and consensus-building. This is 
the greatest challenge of educating for democracy. The necessary counterpoints of individual success—
those individuals who pave the way, and those trampled by the paths laid by others—fade in the clamor 
of individuated articulations. The task of promoting participatory democracy within the telos of 
individual success frames the ultimate contradiction for the educator. 
 
From Theory to Practice: Some Difficulties 
 
Green’s championing of individual self-realization and the common good presumes that the best, the 
perfect, and the ideal are recognizable. However, one may chose to realize oneself in ways 
incomprehensible to others. Green acknowledged this problem when he remarked that self 
determination is equally attributable to “...the man whose will is heteronomous or vicious....”33 Green 
assumed that true individual self-realization would be regarded as a moral principle in that the well 
being of others would be understood as necessary to fulfilling one’s own interests. His remarks about 
self-development of character (and the state’s inability to impose moral character) anticipate that 
individual whose sense of self has been built on a set of inconsistent relations. One may seek to realize 
oneself as an artist and an addict. Those who have combined such goals—Billie Holiday, Charlie 
Parker, Chet Baker, Ernest Hemmingway—lived and created while totally dependent on others but 
appeared quite indifferent to that dependency. Green insists rationality and knowledge are measures of 
the realized self. The common good (in relation to individual self-realization) is a meaningful concept 
only in a society that institutionalizes the dialectical necessity of reason, knowledge, and choice—the 
touchstones of democracy. 
 
 
Thought and Action: The “Old Antagonism” 
 
The Individual and the Masses  
 
The distinction between thought and action (which finds its roots in Plato and Aristotle) represents 
perhaps the most basic tension in education. Is education for the sake of knowledge, or is education 
meant to train people for skills development? This question remains relevant with respect to mass 
education. Green attempted to bridge the “...old antagonism between speculation and action...”34 by 
distinguishing between the theoretical or speculative and the practical or moral. Theoretical or 
speculative knowledge involves efforts to know and to understand, and includes science, philosophy, 
and art. The practical or moral involves practical activities that aim to better the self or to create a 
better condition. The desire to transform and to improve our lives is the goal of knowledge and 
understanding. For Green, art, philosophy, and religion seek to attain perfection, a state of being that 
involves a fusion of thought, action, and objects. When artists create works, when philosophers expose 
paradoxes, and when religious leaders inspire their congregations, what is created is something new and 
different—a genuine creation. 
Green was concerned that the impetus to mass production within modern societies in both the 
arts and the sciences would undermine genuine creation. Individuals, he insisted, are not “...passive 
                                                 
33 Green, 1891b, p. 309.  
34 Green, 1891d, p. 35. 
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receptacles of natural impressions...” and consumers of resources, but rather are “...constructive and 
free....”35 In words that resonate today, Green explained that we 
 
...hear much in these days of the sacrifice of the individual to society through professional 
limitations. In the progressive division of labour, while we become more useful as citizens, we 
seem to lose our completeness as men. The requirements of special study become more 
exacting, at the same time that the perfect organization of modern society removes the 
excitement of adventure and the occasion for independent effort. There is less human interest 
to teach us within our calling, and we have less leisure to seek it beyond.36  
 
Elsewhere, Green remarked that the  
 
...details of all professions are alike out of place in a University education, but a knowledge, not 
merely of the natural laws exhibited in their work, but of the ultimate ends of social life, is 
necessary to emancipate the tradesman and artisan from the bondage of daily routine, and to 
make them work with full energy and intelligence as citizens.37
 
Yet Green’s practical involvement with school reform led to a somewhat different conclusion 
about training and specialization. He recognized different levels of secondary schools are necessary 
because people will choose their own vocations. In other words, different selves construct their worlds 
on the basis of different interests and needs. The practical tensions between general and specialized 
knowledge were a matter of concern for Green. He would have viewed any effort to create separate 
schools focussing on, for example, business and commerce as counterproductive because commerce 
and trade can facilitate the development of impartiality by thrusting individuals into networks that 
involve the evaluation of the interests of self and others in pursuit of plans and projects. Moreover, 
Green argued trade and commerce equalize citizens by breaking down class distinctions and by 
advancing practical knowledge of society.38 Leland noted this universalistic feature of Green’s thought 
when she wrote that educational theory is not an effort 
 
…to digress from facts; it is an attempt to get closer to them by showing them in their broader 
setting and relations, and thus revealing their meaning. In the present age of specialization which 
extends even to the field of education, there is the danger of one man seeing the facts of his 
own particular line of work without realizing their significance in the whole of reality, and thus 
there is the possibility of his conceiving his own little share in the whole as if it were the whole. 
This may account at least partially for the fact that many special school supervisors can see 
nothing except the special subjects which they are supervising and cannot therefore adjust these 
subjects with any sense of proportion to the rest of the curriculum.39
 
In promoting such a view, Green anticipated the educational reforms and developments of the 
twentieth century. If democracy means each citizen should vote with some understanding of the issues, 
and see how they relate to other issues and persons, then each individual must be educated in order to 
become a knowledgeable and contributing citizen. 
 
                                                 
35 Green, 1891c, p. 112. 
36 Green, 1891d, p.  40. 
37 Green, 2003d, p. 21. 
38 Green, 2003e, p. 3. 
39 Leland, 1911, p. 54. The emphasis is original. 
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The Democratic Self: The Classroom Challenge 
 
To become a democratic self one must participate in the construction of democratic relations between 
oneself and others. How is a developing child to experience that crucial development towards valuing 
the universality of such experiences without the opportunity to experience the benefits to the self and 
others on a daily basis? Sporadic voting after one reaches voting age is not enough. By the time one is 
old enough to vote, the reasons to do so may have been stifled in the world of disparate, random facts 
and self-aggrandizement. In Green’s view, individual interests and common good are not opposite 
forces but are the precursors to moral and social development. The perpetual dialectical conflict will 
result in the emergence of a higher good. The implication for educators is clear: they fail in their task if 
students are taught that individual interests and needs are irreconcilable with others’ interests and 
needs. 
 
 
Whither Democracy?  
 
Green uniformly stressed that the good life cannot be gained in isolation but only through participation 
in the various associations and institutions that comprise society. The school is one of the most basic 
social institutions. Schools embody curriculum development and implementation, and the very purpose, 
ideas, and ideals of the community in which they reside. What is important about Green’s recognition 
of the tensions between the basic objectives of education—the intrinsic and extrinsic objectives—is 
that he anticipates and confronts some of the challenges of modern mass education. Can mass 
education create democratic citizens? The necessary antagonisms and tensions in education and the 
intrinsic value of knowledge require teachers to convey to students the fact that individual interests 
must be balanced and harmonized, and that the individual’s good is intimately related to the recognition 
of others’ goods. Democracy formalizes this recognition as a form of common good, one that 
encourages individual decision-making about community life, the life that makes human and humane 
life possible. 
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